事實脈絡
解讀與影響
New Pass-ta-key 攻击揭示了我们此前对通行密钥的诸多未知
通行密钥作为一种旨在替代传统密码的无密码认证方案，其设计初衷是让用户通过生物识别或设备解锁完成登录，私钥本身不出设备。然而，Ars Technica 指出，Pass-ta-key 攻击所暴露的问题并不在于协议本身的缺陷，而在于各平台实现层面的不一致：部分通行密钥管理应用在 Windows 上采用了与其他操作系统不同的同步或存储策略，导致攻击者可能在特定条件下诱导用户将密钥导出或迁移至不受信任的环境。原文未提供该攻击具体的技术细节与受影响应用清单。
从时间线看，该攻击的披露始于安全研究人员对跨平台通行密钥行为的系统性比对，随后相关发现被整理为“Pass-ta-key”并在 2026 年 8 月公开。Ars Technica 的跟进报道将讨论焦点从“通行密钥是否已被攻破”拉回至“实现差异是否构成现实威胁”，并强调目前没有证据表明大规模利用已经发生。这一判断与通行密钥的整体安全模型相符：私钥仍受设备安全模块保护，攻击者若要得手，通常需要额外的本地访问权限或社会工程配合。
值得注意的是，相关素材中并未包含与该安全事件直接相关的其他技术报道。所列 MIT Tech Review 的几篇文章分别涉及儿童对 AI 的看法、小鼠性别克隆实验、智能体数据可信度以及青年创新者评选，均与 Pass-ta-key 攻击无直接关联，因此本文未将其纳入分析。对于关注通行密钥生态的读者而言，此次事件的主要启示在于：跨平台实现的一致性仍是无密码认证推广过程中需要持续审视的工程问题，而非密码学层面的紧急警报。
參考來源
來源原文
Last week, a researcher outlined what he said was a “novel attack surface” in passkeys, the new authentication paradigm that offers a more secure alternative to password-based methods. In fact, the attacks demonstrated in the post are neither novel nor unique to passkeys. This distinction is important because the research has generated confusion among end users and security professionals as they assess whether this new mechanism is truly safe to use.
The attack is called Pass-ta-key—a blending of the word passkey with the phrase “pass the key” and a nod to a plate of pasta. Arie Olshtein, a researcher at security firm Palo Alto Networks, described in a post last week how Pass-ta-key could obtain all passkeys stored in the Google Password Manager app (GPM) for Windows when it’s running on a machine infected with malware.
This came as a surprise to many people because they believed passkeys are stored exclusively in the trusted platform manager (TPM), the locked-down enclave in a hardened silicon chip that’s reserved for storing cryptographic keys and other highly sensitive information on Windows machines. If passkeys are stored in the TPM, then how was Pass-ta-key able to extract the entire set of passkeys stored by the app, they wanted to know.